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INTRODUCTION
Reuter and Caulkins [1995] state that the appropriate goals of any drug policy are 
the reduction of drug consumption and the reduction of related harm. Often, federal 
drug enforcement does not simultaneously produce the desired goals. Lee [1993], for 
example, shows that increased harassment of drug users decreases dealer costs as 
drug users make fewer drug transactions. Under these conditions, drug prices may 
fall resulting in a potential increase in illicit drug consumption. As well, many other 
studies show that crime, clearly a related harm, often rises during episodes of increased 
drug enforcement spending. Benson et al. [1992] show that Florida experienced an 
increase in property crime during the mid-1980's as enforcement agencies diverted 
scarce law enforcement resources to drug enforcement and away from activities such 
as theft enforcement. Another study by Rasmussen et al. [1993] shows that intensiﬁ  ed 
drug reduction efforts in one jurisdiction entice dealers to move to a jurisdiction with 
low drug enforcement. Migration results in a higher violent crime rate as migrant 
drug dealers struggle for turf with incumbent dealers. Miron [1999] surmises that 
arresting dealers generates violence as other dealers ﬁ  ght over freed up turf. 
Harm associated with increased drug enforcement is not, however, limited to 
increased non-drug crime; enforcement may also lead to the consumption of higher 
purity (more dangerous) drugs. Similar to penalties for bootlegging during the Prohibi-
tion years, the severity of punishment for drug distribution, under federal sentencing 
guidelines, is based on the weight and generally ignores the purity of conﬁ  scated drugs. 
Thus, an increase in the certainty of punishment for drug trafﬁ  cking motivates the 
distribution of lower weight, higher purity drugs [Rasmussen and Benson, 1994]. In 
support of this proposition, Warburton [1932] shows that the Prohibition years were 
characterized by an increase in the consumption of high potency alcohol products 
relative to low potency products. Similarly, Demleitner [1994] proposes that the War 
on Drugs resulted in a shift from marijuana consumption to cocaine consumption. 
Evidence also suggests that street level quantities of a particular drug may become 
more pure during increased enforcement. Thornton [1991] shows that a $1 million 
increase in real federal drug enforcement spending results in a 0.01 percent increase 
in marijuana purity. The U.S. drug experience conﬁ  rms (generally) this phenomenon 
for cocaine and heroin. While federal expenditures on drug control increased almost 630 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
600 percent from 1982 to 2000, Table 1 shows that the purity of retail level cocaine 
increased from 36 percent to 61 percent while the purity of street level heroin has 
increased from 5 percent to 25 percent during the same time period. 
  TABLE 1
  Cocaine and Heroin Purity and Price per Pure Gram, Federal Drug
  Budget   Expenditures, and Emergency Room Drug Episodes [1982-2000]
Year Cocaine  Cocaine  Heroin Heroin  Federal  Drug  Induced
  Purity Price  per Purity  Price  per  Drug  Death  Rates
    Pure Gram    Pure Gram  Enforcement  per 100,000
         Expenditures  Population
1982 36 433  5  3,285  2,633  3.2
1983 39 399  6  3,652  2,966  3.2
1984 44 378  8  3,485  3,493  3.3
1985 40 328  8  3,146  3,945  3.6
1986 51 315  9  3,502  4,042  4.2
1987 64 292 11  3,306  6,546  4.0
1988 75 238 17  3,123  6,219  4.5
1989 78 226 19  2,597  8,482  4.3
1990 69 267 16  2,924  11,957  3.8
1991 78 227 17  3,022  12,974  4.1
1992 76 224 21  2,863  13,385  4.6
1993 74 199 25  2,635  13,504  5.1
1994 73 187 25  2,721  13,251  5.3
1995 67 196 24  2,652  14,091  5.4
1996 72 175 23  2,424  13,837  5.6
1997 65 195 28  2,373  15,040  6.0
1998 68 183 25  2,087  15,729  6.3
1999 64 184 27  1,929  17,492  7.0
2000 61 212 25  2,088  17,818  7.2
Notes: Purity and price ﬁ  gures are reported by the Ofﬁ  ce of National Drug Control Policy and come from 
the DEA’s System to Retrieve Information on Drug Evidence. Drug budget expenditures are collected from 
various issues of EOP National Drug Control Strategy. Expenditure ﬁ  gures are reported in billions of real 
chained 2000 dollars. Drug induced deaths are from the National Vital Statistics Report, volumes 47-50, 
and do not include alcohol or cigarette deaths.
Rasmussen and Benson [1994] worry that increased purity may increase the 
quantity of pure drugs consumed. Indeed, both Warburton [1932] and Demlietner 
[1994] note increased alcohol and drug related overdoses during Prohibition and the 
War on Drugs, respectively. In other words, while the weight of drugs consumed may 
decrease, increased purity may result in increased pure drug consumption, equal to 
the weight times the purity of drugs consumed. The recent U.S. drug environment 
roughly conﬁ  rms these fears, as total drug induced deaths per 100,000 population 
generally increased from 1982-2000 (see Table 1). This phenomenon may be explained 
by the law of demand. If street level prices per weight of drugs are relatively stable, an 
increase in drug purity decreases the price of pure drug consumption. The phenomena 
of increased enforcement, increased consumption of drugs, and decreased drug prices 
are highlighted in Basov et al. [2001].
This study seeks to determine, in a simple, theoretical framework, whether current 
federal sentencing guidelines, in which dealers are punished according to the weight 631 IMPACT OF WEIGHT-BASED PENALTIES
of drugs they possess at the time of arrest, contribute to an increase in pure drug 
consumption when law enforcement efforts are increased. If weight-based penalties 
trigger increased purity, and increased purity leads to a decrease in the price of pure 
drug consumption, an increase in the certainty of punishment may increase illicit 
drug use. Furthermore, this study seeks to determine whether this same undesirable 
result holds when penalties are, instead, increasing in the quantity of pure drugs at 
the time of arrest, an alternative penalty structure that would result in little extra 
cost for law enforcement agencies.
Five sections comprise the paper. A model of drug user and drug dealer behavior 
is presented in the next section. The following section characterizes the equilibrium 
of the model and explores the impact of increased enforcement under weight-based 
penalties. Pure drug penalties are then considered in the fourth section, and the ﬁ  nal 
section concludes the paper. 
MODEL
Consider a competitive drug market, as did Lee [1993]. The market consists of n 
drug dealers and m drug users. The representative drug user purchases a quantity 
of street level (retail level) drugs, qr, from a dealer at a per unit retail price of pr.1   
The purity of street level drugs is given by x and is known by the user at the time of 
purchase. For simplicity, equilibrium purity is always less than 100 percent, 0 < x* < 1, 
an assumption consistent with U. S. historical purity data (see Table 1).
User Behavior 
The representative user derives utility from the quantity of pure drugs consumed 
where the quantity of pure drugs equals the quantity of retail drugs consumed times 
the purity of the retail drugs, qd = qrx.2  The user also derives utility from the consump-
tion of a licit market good, c. The user’s utility function is separable and is given by
(1)  U = U(c) + U(qd).
The user purchases drugs and the licit market good with income endowment, 
M. The price of the consumption good is pc, and the price of pure drugs (the effective 
price of drugs) is pd and is equal to the retail price of drugs divided by the purity of 
retail drugs, pd = pr/x.3  
The user faces a pecuniary penalty in the event of arrest for drug possession.4  The 
probability of arrest for drug possession is given by α. Consistent with federal drug 
sentencing guidelines, the severity of punishment increases in the weight of drugs 
possessed where the weight of drugs equals qr (the quantity of retail drugs purchased 
by the user). The severity of punishment is given by θ(qr) where θ is continuous and 
differentiable and where θ' > 0 and θ" > 0.5  Thus, the user’s budget constraint is 
characterized by632 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
  M = pcc + pdqd  with probability 1 – α 
and 
  M = pcc + pdqd + θ(qr) with  probability  α.
Assuming that users are risk neutral, noting that qr = qd/x, and substituting the 
budget restrictions into (1), the drug user chooses qd to maximize
(2)    U = U((M – pdqd – αθ(qd/x))/pc) + U(qd)
given pd, pc, M, x, and α. The ﬁ  rst-order condition for this maximization problem is 
(3) –  U'(c)[( pd + αθ'(qd/x)(1/x))/pc] + U'(qd) = 0.
The second-order condition for a maximum requires that
 –  U  '(c)[αθ"(qd/x)(1/x2)/pc] + U"(c)[( pd + αθ'(qd/x)(1/x))/pc]2 + U"(qd) < 0
which is satisﬁ  ed under the assumption that θ" > 0. 
Following equation (3), it is straightforward to show that the representative 
user’s demand is a function of the price of pure drugs, purity, income, the probability 
of arrest for possession, and the price of licit consumption: qd = qd(pd,x,M,α,pc). Using 
the implicit function theorem, drug consumption is easily shown to follow the law 
of demand, ∂qd/∂pd < 0.6  In addition, pure drug consumption increases as income 
increases, ∂pc/∂M > 0, decreases as the probability of arrest increases, ∂qd/∂α < 0, 
and increases as purity increases, ∂qd/∂x > 0. I term this last effect the “possession 
effect” because an increase in purity reduces the severity of punishment if the user is 
captured for possession of a given quantity of pure drugs. The impact of the price of 
market consumption on drug consumption is indeterminate. Graphically, the demand 
curve is the usual shape with purity, income, probability of user arrest, and the price 
of market consumption as shift variables.
It is possible to simplify the expression for the demand of drugs by rearranging 
the equation for the effective price of drugs (pd = pr/x) so that purity is a function of 
the price of pure drugs and the price of street drugs. Substituting, the representative 
user’s demand function becomes qd = qd(pd,(pr/pd),M,α,pc). Since the price of pure drugs 
now enters two arguments in the demand expression, the user’s demand function is 
rewritten as Qd = Qd(pd,pr,M,α,pc). It is straightforward to show that the new expres-
sion for the representative user’s demand for drugs, Qd, provides the following partial 
derivatives: ∂Qd/∂pr < 0, ∂Qd/∂M > 0, and ∂Qd/∂α < 0. In addition, an increase in the 
price of pure drugs decreases the quantity of drugs demanded not only through the 
law of demand but also through the “possession effect” (an increase in the price of pure 
drugs, with street level prices remaining constant, indicates that purity is decreasing and 
possession penalties are increasing): ∂Qd/∂pd = ∂qd/∂pd + ∂qd/∂x [-pr/pd
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user demand, Qd, is the usual shape with the retail price of drugs, income, and the 
probability of user arrest for drug possession as shift variables.
Dealer Behavior
Representative drug dealer proﬁ  ts may also be stated in terms of pure drugs sup-
plied where dealer proﬁ  ts equal drug revenues minus drug costs. Revenues equal the 
price of pure drugs times the quantity of pure drugs supplied, pdqs. Costs include the 
purchase of pure drugs and the transformation (cutting) of these drugs into street 
level purity. Transformation costs are generally small [Coomber, 1999]. The marginal 
cost of purchasing and transforming pure drugs is constant and given by c. 
Dealer costs also include potential pecuniary drug selling penalties. The probabil-
ity of arrest for dealing drugs is given by ρ. Consistent with federal drug sentencing 
guidelines, the severity of punishment increases in the weight of drugs sold where the 
weight of drugs sold equals the quantity of pure drugs sold divided by purity, qs/x. The 
severity of punishment is given by Ψ(qs/x) where Ψ is continuous and differentiable 
and where Ψ' > 0 and Ψ" > 0.7
Given these speciﬁ  cs, the representative dealer’s costs are given by
(4)  C = cqs + ρΨ(qs/x).
From equation (4), the marginal cost of selling drugs is given by
(5)  MC = ∂C/∂qs = c + ρΨ'(qs/x)/x
where marginal costs are positive implying that costs are increasing in the quantity 
of drugs supplied. Using the assumption that Ψ" > 0, equation (5) shows that mar-
ginal costs are increasing in the quantity of drugs sold, in the cost of purchasing and 
transforming drugs, and in the probability that a dealer is arrested, but are decreas-
ing in the purity of drugs:
(6)  ∂MC/∂qs = ρΨ"(qs/x)/x2 > 0,
(7)  ∂MC/∂c = 1 > 0,
(8)  ∂MC/∂ρ = Ψ'(qs/x)/x > 0, and 
(9)  ∂MC/∂x = –(ρ/x2)[Ψ'(qs/x) + (qs/x)Ψ"(qs/x)] < 0.
Inequalities (6) – (8) give straightforward results while inequality (9) requires only a 
brief discussion. Intuitively, an increase (decrease) in the purity of drugs decreases 
(increases) the weight of drugs supplied and, consequently, expected dealer penal-
ties. Thus, the marginal cost of supplying drugs is reduced (increased). Graphically, 
inequalities (6) – (9) imply that the dealer's marginal cost curve is an upward sloping 
function of qs, that an increase in the cost of purchasing and transforming drugs or 634 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
an increase in the probability of dealer arrest shifts the marginal cost curve up, and 
that an increase in purity results in a downward shift in the marginal cost curve. 
Given revenue and cost speciﬁ  cations, expected dealer proﬁ  ts are
(10)  π = pdqs – cqs – ρΨ(qs/x).
Drug dealers in competitive markets are price takers. Since the price variable in this 
model is the price of pure drugs, price taking implies that the street price of drugs and 
drug purity are determined exogenously. Thus, the representative dealer maximizes 
equation (10) by choosing the quantity of pure drugs to supply given the street price 
and the street purity (and, consequently, the effective price) of drugs. The ﬁ  rst-order 
condition for this maximization problem is
(11)  pd – c – ρΨ'(qs/x)/x = 0
which implies that, at the optimal quantity of drugs supplied, marginal revenue equals 
marginal cost. The second-order condition for a maximum requires that
(12) –  ρΨ"(qs/x)/x2 < 0,
a condition satisﬁ  ed under the assumption that Ψ" > 0. 
Equation (11) suggests that quantity supplied is a function of the effective price 
of pure drugs, purity, the marginal cost of drugs, and the certainty of punishment: qs 
= qs(pd,x,c,ρ). Using the implicit function theorem, the quantity of drugs supplied is 
increasing in the effective price of drugs, ∂qs/∂pd > 0. I call this effect the “revenue ef-
fect”. In other words, an increase in marginal revenue (via the effective price of drugs) 
increases the quantity of drugs at which marginal revenue intersects the marginal 
cost curve (see Figure 1).
An increase in the purity of drugs decreases the weight of drugs supplied and, 
thus, expected dealer penalties. In response, the dealer increases the supply of 
drugs, ∂qs/∂x > 0, which I term the “trafﬁ  cking effect” of an increase in purity. This 
is equivalent to a downward shift in the marginal cost curve, implying that the mar-
ginal cost curve intersects marginal revenues at a higher quantity (see Figure 2). As 
well, quantity supplied is decreasing in both the marginal cost of purchasing and 
transforming raw drugs and the certainty of punishment: ∂qs/∂c < 0 and ∂qs/∂ρ < 0. 
These two cases are graphically interpreted as an upward shift in the marginal cost 
curve (see Figure 2). 
Because the street level price of drugs is stable, an increase in the effective price 
of drugs indicates a decrease in purity as x = pr/pd. Substituting this expression into 
the representative dealer’s drug supply gives qs = qs(pd,(pr/pd),c,ρ). Since the price of 
pure drugs enters two arguments in the supply of drugs, this expression is rewritten 
as Qs = Qs(pd,pr,c,ρ) (so that pd enters only one argument in the supply function).635 IMPACT OF WEIGHT-BASED PENALTIES
  FIGURE 1
  An Increase in Marginal Revenue Increases the 
  Quantity of Drugs Supplied
 FIGURE  2
  The Impact of a Change in Purity (x), Drug Transformation Costs (c), 
  and the Certainty of Dealer Punishment (ρ) on the 
  Quantity of Drugs Supplied.
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It is straightforward to show that the new expression for the representative 
dealer’s supply of drugs, Qs, yields the following partial derivatives: ∂Qs/∂pr > 0, 
∂Qs/∂c < 0, and ∂Qs/∂ρ < 0. Furthermore, the new expression for the representative 
dealer’s supply of drugs indicates that, on the one hand, an increase in the price of 
pure drugs increases the quantity of drugs supplied by increasing the effective price 
of drugs (i.e., the “revenue effect”), but, on the other hand, an increase in price of 
pure drugs decreases the supply of drugs by increasing the severity of punishment, 
ceteris paribus (i.e., the “trafﬁ  cking effect”). Graphically, an increase in the price of 
pure drugs implies not only an increase in marginal revenue but also a decrease in 
purity and a shift up in the marginal cost curve (see Figure 3). Thus, the total impact 
of a change in the effective price on quantity supplied, ∂Qs/∂pd = ∂qs/∂pd + ∂qs/∂x [-
pr/pd
2], is ambiguous and is determined by applying the implicit function theorem to 
equation (11):
(13) sign(∂Qs/∂pd) = sign[1 – (ρ/pr)(Ψ'(qs/x) + ((qs   pd)/pr) Ψ"(qs/x))].
If 1 > (ρ/pr)(Ψ'(qs/x) + ((qs   pd)/pr)Ψ"(qs/x)), an increase in the effective price of drugs 
increases the quantity of drugs supplied as the beneﬁ  ts reaped from an increase in 
revenues outweigh the expected punishment costs of an increase in purity (with street 
level prices remaining constant). In other words, the “revenue effect” dominates the 
“trafﬁ  cking effect”. In this case, the supply of drugs is increasing in price. If the “traf-
ﬁ  cking effect” dominates the “revenue effect”, 1 < (ρ/pr)(Ψ'(qs/x) + ((qs  pd)/pr)Ψ"(qs/x)), 
an increase in the effective price of drugs decreases the quantity of drugs supplied as 
increased costs from decreased purity outweigh increased revenues. In this case, the 
supply of drugs is decreasing in price.
 FIGURE  3
  An Increase in Price Shifts the Marginal Cost Curve Up to Either MC' 
  (Quantity Supplied Increases) or MC'' (Quantity Supplied Decreases)
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 FIGURE  4
  The Representative Dealer’s Supply Curve if 
 1  > (ρ/pr)(Ψ'(qs/x) + ((qspd)/pr)Ψ"(qs/x))
 
 FIGURE  5
  The Representative Dealer’s Supply Curve if 
  1 < (ρ/pr)(Ψ'(qs/x) + ((qspd)/pr)Ψ"(qs/x))
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Interestingly, market supply is not the horizontal sum of each dealer’s marginal 
cost curve. Figures 4 and 5 show that the representative dealer’s supply curve is the 
set of all the possible marginal revenue/marginal cost intersections over various price 
levels. If equation (13) is positive, quantity supplied increases as price increases and 
the supply curve is upward sloping (see Figure 4). If equation (13) is negative, the 
supply curve is downward sloping equation (see Figure 5). The market supply curve 
is the horizontal sum of all n dealer supply curves. 
EQUILIBRIUM AND COMPARATIVE STATICS
The equilibrium of the model is now deﬁ  ned. After the deﬁ  nition is given, the 
impact of an increase in the probability that users and dealers are arrested is con-
sidered. 
Equilibrium
An equilibrium in the competitive drug market implies an effective (pure) drug 
price, pd*, and a retail (street) price, pr*, such that market supply, nQs(pd*,pr*,c,ρ), 
equals market demand, mQd(pd*,pr*,M,α,pc): 
  nQs(pd*,pr*,c,ρ) - mQd(pd*,pr*,M,α,pc) = 0.
Consistent with several studies, this paper assumes that the retail price and the 
weight of the sales unit of street level drugs are constant over time while the purity 
of street level drugs is variable. Grund [1998] and Neaigus et al. [1998] provide mo-
tivation for this assumption by maintaining that heroin has historically been sold as 
dime or nickel bags implying a price of $10 or $5, respectively. While each bag has an 
established weight, the purity of these bags is variable. As well, Inciardi [1987] notes 
that powder cocaine is typically retailed by the gram though Hamid [1992] allows 
also for half gram and other purchases. The street price per gram of various weights 
of cocaine, however, remains relatively stable over time. Grossman, Chaloupka, and 
Brown [1996] ﬁ  nd a 78 percent decrease in the price per pure gram of cocaine from 
1978 to 1987, a decrease “traced to a large increase in purity from 32 percent in the 
former year to 73 percent in the latter year and to a modest 12 percent decline in the 
money price of one gram of cocaine not adjusted for purity at the same time as the 
CPI rose by 75 percent”.8  Poret [2002] notes that dealers do not increase street prices 
of drugs but decrease the quantity of pure drugs (i.e., decrease drug purity) per dose 
in order to increase drug prices.
Because the street level price of drugs is assumed stable, the equilibrium for 
the street level drug market can be deﬁ  ned in terms of only the price of pure drugs. 
An equilibrium implies an effective price of drugs, pd*, such that market supply, 
nQs(pd*,pr,c,ρ), equals market demand, mQd(pd*,pr,M,α,pc): 
  nQs(pd*,pr,c,ρ) - mQd(pd*,pr,M,α,pc) = 0.639 IMPACT OF WEIGHT-BASED PENALTIES
Obviously, the equilibrium effective price of drugs coupled with the constant 
retail price of drugs determine the “equilibrium” purity of drugs sold and purchased, 
x* = pr/pd*.
Comparative Statics
The impacts of changes in the certainty of dealer and user punishment and of 
changes in other exogenous variables on the equilibrium pure price (and, thus, the 
equilibrium purity) and the equilibrium quantity traded of drugs is now determined 
(with the primary emphases on changes in the certainty of dealer and user punish-
ment). 
Using the equilibrium condition above, if the probability of arrest for users is 
increased, the impact to the equilibrium effective price and the equilibrium quantity 
of drugs traded depends on the shape of the supply curve
 (14)  ∂pd*/∂α= m(∂Qd/∂α)/[n(∂Qs/∂pd) - m(∂Qd/∂pd)].
Since the numerator of equation (14) is negative, the impact of an increase in 
the certainty of user punishment on equilibrium purity is given by the sign of the 
denominator - the difference between the slopes of the market supply curve and the 
market demand curve evaluated at the equilibrium effective price of drugs (assuming 
that quantity is graphed on the y-axis). 
If equation (13) is positive, the representative dealer’s supply curve is increasing 
in the effective price of drugs, market supply is upward sloping in the effective price 
of drugs, and equation (14) is negative; equilibrium effective price decreases with the 
probability of arresting drug users (which is equivalent to an increase in the purity 
of drugs, ceteris paribus). Using equation (14) and substituting into the expression 
for Qs, it is easily shown that, if equation (13) is positive, drug use is decreased when 
user enforcement is increased.
If equation (13) is negative, the representative dealer’s supply curve and the 
market supply curve are decreasing in the effective price of drugs; the impact of 
user enforcement on the effective price of drugs and the quantity of drugs traded 
depends on difference between the slope of the market supply curve and the slope of 
the market demand curve. If the slope of the supply curve is greater than, in absolute 
value, the slope of the demand curve, the denominator of equation (14) is negative 
and equilibrium effective price increases (the purity of drugs decreases). Under this 
scenario, pure drug use is reduced. If the slope of the market supply curve is less than 
the slope of the market demand curve in absolute value, the denominator of equa-
tion (14) is positive and equilibrium effective price decreases (purity increases) while 
drug use increases. In this ﬁ  nal case, a policy designed to reduce drug consumption 
by targeting the arrest of drug users actually increases drug consumption and drug 
purity (see Figure 6).
The same general comments can be made of the other factors that inﬂ  uence de-
mand. If equation (13) is positive, any factor that increases (decreases) demand (i.e., an 
increase (decrease) in income assuming that drug use is a normal good) will increase 640 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
(decrease) both the quantity of drugs traded and the effective price of drugs (result-
ing in a decrease (increase) in drug purity). If equation (13) is negative and the slope 
of the supply curve is greater than, in absolute value, the slope of the demand curve, 
any factor that increases (decreases) demand will increase (decrease) the quantity 
of drugs traded and decrease (increase) the effective price of drugs. If equation (13) 
is negative and the slope of the supply curve is smaller than, in absolute value, the 
slope of the demand curve, any factor that increases (decreases) demand decreases 
(increases) the quantity of drugs traded and increases (decreases) the effective price 
of drugs. 
 FIGURE  6
  The Impact of an Increase in the Certainty of User Punishment if the 
  Slope of the Market Supply Curve is Negative and is Less than the 
  Slope of the Market Demand Curve (in Absolute Value)  
An increase in the probability that dealers are arrested can have similar, unantici-
pated results. From the equilibrium condition, the impact to equilibrium purity and 
the quantity of drugs traded once again depends on the shape of the supply curve
 (15)  ∂pd*/∂ρ= - n(∂Qs/∂ρ)/[n(∂Qs/∂pd) - m(∂Qd/∂pd)].
Since the numerator of equation (15) is positive, equation (15) is positive if market 
supply is upward sloping in the effective price of drugs (if equation (13) is positive); 
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(equivalent to a decrease in the purity of drugs). In this case, the quantity traded of 
drugs also decreases. 
If, however, market supply is downward sloping in the effective price of drugs 
(equation (13) is negative), the impact of dealer enforcement on the effective price and 
the quantity of drugs traded again depends on the difference in the slopes of the mar-
ket supply and demand curves. If the slope of the supply curve is less than the slope 
of the demand curve in absolute value, the denominator of equation (15) is positive 
and the equilibrium effective price of drugs increases and drug use decreases (purity 
decreases). If the slope of the supply curve exceeds the slope of the demand curve in 
absolute value, equation (15) is negative and equilibrium drug use increases while 
the effective price of drugs decreases. In this ﬁ  nal case, a policy designed to reduce 
drug consumption by targeting the arrest of drug dealers increases drug consumption 
and drug purity (see Figure 7).
 FIGURE  7
 The Impact of an Increase in the Certainty of Dealer Punishment if the 
  Slope of the Market Supply Curve is Negative and is Greater than the 
  Slope of the Market Demand Curve (in Absolute Value) 
Similar comments can be made of the other factors that inﬂ  uence supply. If 
equation (13) is positive, any factor that increases (decreases) supply (i.e., a decrease 
(increase) in the cost of purchasing and transforming raw drugs) will increase (de-
crease) the quantity of drugs traded and decrease (increase) the effective price of drugs 
(resulting in an increase (decrease) in drug purity). If equation (13) is negative and 
the slope of the supply curve is less than the slope of the demand curve in absolute 
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value, any factor that increases (decreases) supply will decrease (increase) the effec-
tive price of drugs and increase (decrease) the quantity of drugs traded. If the slope 
of the supply curve is greater than the slope of the demand curve in absolute value, 
any factor that increases (decreases) supply increases (decreases) the effective price 
of drugs and decreases (increases) the quantity of drugs traded. 
As noted in the introduction, the U.S. experience is consistent with increased 
drug enforcement, decreased effective drug prices, increased purity, and, perhaps, 
increased drug consumption [Basov et al., 2001].9  From the above analysis, it is only 
possible for an increase in enforcement to increase both the purity of drugs (decrease 
the effective price of drugs) and the quantity of drugs traded when the supply curve 
for drugs is downward sloping in the effective price of drugs (upward sloping in the 
purity of drugs). If the slope of the supply curve is greater than the slope of the de-
mand curve in absolute value, an increase in dealer enforcement increases purity and 
the quantity of drugs traded. If the slope of the supply curve is less than, in absolute 
value, the slope of the demand curve, an increase in user enforcement increases purity 
and the quantity of drugs traded. It is important to note that, in these cases, drug use 
increases, and the increase represents a failure in illicit drug policy. This is roughly 
consistent with increased U.S. overdoses from 1982-2000 (see Table 1).10  
Obviously, a word of caution must be extended. As has been shown, factors 
other than enforcement can impact the drug equilibrium. Even when the supply and 
demand curves have the usual slopes, any factor that increases the supply of drugs 
may, in fact, increase both drug purity (decrease the effective price of drugs) and the 
quantity of drugs traded. For example, Basov et al. [2001] suppose that declining 
production costs, increased taxes on legal goods, movement of drug markets away 
from monopoly power, and better methods to decrease the likelihood that drug deal-
ers are detected have increased market supply, even in the face of increased drug 
enforcement. Therefore, federal drug policy cannot be blamed for increased drug use 
and drug purity. On the other hand, the possibility that federal drug policies may 
have adverse, unintended consequences should cause policymakers to reconsider the 
penalty structure for punishing users and dealers. 
PENALTIES INCREASING IN THE QUANTITY OF PURE DRUGS 
SUPPLIED: AN ALTERNATE PENALTY STRUCTURE
An alternative penalty structure for drug users and drug dealers is now consid-
ered; punishment, for both users and dealers, increases in the quantity of pure drugs 
supplied. In particular, users and dealers have severity of punishment functions θ(qd) 
and Ψ(qs), respectively, where θ and Ψ are continuous and differentiable and where 
θ' > 0, θ" > 0, Ψ' > 0, and Ψ" > 0. Applying the change in user punishment to equation 
(2), the ﬁ  rst order condition for the representative user’s maximization problem is 
given by
(16) –  U'(c)[( pd + αθ'(qd))/pc] + U'(qd) = 0,643 IMPACT OF WEIGHT-BASED PENALTIES
and the second-order condition for a maximum requires that
 –  U'(c)[αθ"(qd)/pc] + U"(c)[( pd + αθ'(qd))/pc]2 + U"(qd) < 0
which is satisﬁ  ed under the assumption that θ" > 0. 
Under penalties that increase in pure drugs, it is easy to show that the represen-
tative user’s demand is a function of the price of pure drugs, income, the probability 
of arrest for possession, and the price of licit consumption, Qd = Qd(pd,M,α,pc), where 
the signs of the partial derivatives are the same as above. Of note, there is no “pos-
session effect” which induces users to purchase more pure drugs when purity rises; 
an increase in purity no longer reduces the severity of punishment for possessing 
drugs. An increase in purity increases the demand for drugs only by decreasing the 
price of pure drugs. 
Applying the new penalty structure for dealers to equation (10), the ﬁ  rst-order 
condition for the dealer’s maximization problem becomes
(17)  pd – c – ρΨ'(qs) = 0.
The second-order condition for a maximum requires that
 – ρΨ"(qs) < 0
which is, again, satisﬁ  ed under the assumption that Ψ" > 0. 
Equation (17) suggests that quantity supplied is a function of the effective price of 
pure drugs, the marginal cost of drugs, and the certainty of punishment, Qs = Qs(pd,c,ρ), 
where the signs for the partial derivatives are as before. Quantity supplied, with the 
new penalty structure, is not, however, a function of purity as an increase in purity 
no longer decreases dealer penalties (the “trafﬁ  cking effect” no longer impacts the 
dealer). Therefore, the dealer’s supply curve, under the new speciﬁ  cation for dealer 
penalties, unambiguously increases in price (decreases in purity). A downward slop-
ing supply curve, therefore, is not possible. 
Assuming that the retail price of drugs is exogenous, an equilibrium for this model 
is an effective price, pd*, that satisﬁ  es:
(18)  nQs(pd*, c, ρ) - mQd(pd*, M, α, pc) = 0.
Applying the implicit function to equation (18), an increase in user enforcement 
decreases the equilibrium effective price of drugs (purity is increased) and decreases 
drug use while an increase in dealer enforcement increases the effective price of drugs 
(decreases purity) and decreases drug use. In other words, if the supply curve for il-
licit drugs is decreasing in the effective price of drugs under the current weight-based 
penalty structure, policy makers would be wise to change to a penalty structure under 
which both user and dealer penalties increase in the quantity of pure drugs. 644 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
This penalty structure may be achieved without a serious increase in the cost of 
law enforcement. Conﬁ  scated substances are already tested to determine whether 
they contain illicit drugs. Sentences are then given based on the weight of the drugs 
seized without reference to the quantity of pure drugs seized except in the case where 
substances are “of unusually high purity” [USSC, 2004]. Since drugs are already 
weighed and tested to see if a minimum purity level is achieved, it would not be overly 
costly to determine the actual purity and to multiply the purity by the weight of drugs 
conﬁ  scated to determine the quantity of pure drugs conﬁ  scated.
CONCLUSION
It is well documented that illicit drug policies create unintended consequences. 
This paper adds to this literature by showing that, under certain conditions, increases 
in the certainty that drug dealers or drug users are captured increases the purity of 
street level drugs. This may increase drug consumption as the increase in purity de-
creases effective drug prices, deﬁ  ned as the price per pure unit of drugs. This ﬁ  nding 
depends on the assumption of weight-based penalties for illicit drug dealing, where 
dealers are punished based on the weight of drugs in their possession at the time 
of arrest. In other words, dealers respond to increased enforcement by reducing the 
weight of drugs sold through increased purity. 
This paper also shows that a switch from weight-based drug penalties to penal-
ties based on the quantity of pure drugs in possession eliminates the ﬁ  nding that an 
increase in dealer or user enforcement increases the purity of drugs consumed. This 
switch would likely result in little extra cost for enforcement agencies and, perhaps, 
little political resistance. 
 NOTES
  This research was funded by a Cameron School of Business Summer Research Grant. The author 
thanks two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. All errors are the sole responsibility of 
the author.
1.  The assumption is made that the user knows that all dealers peddle a homogeneous product. Thus, 
the user does not experience search costs.
2.  I assume that, since drug purity is known to the user at the time of a drug purchase, street level 
drugs are easily titrated into the quantity of pure drugs that the user desires. If, for example, the 
user desires to purchase 2 grams of pure cocaine and the street level purity of 1 gram of cocaine is 50 
percent, the user purchases 4 grams of street level cocaine. 
 3.  If the street price of a gram of 50 percent pure cocaine is $200, the price of a pure gram of cocaine 
equals $400.
4.  In this model, penalties are pecuniary while federal sentencing guidelines provide for months of jail 
time. 
5.  Federal sentencing guidelines specify that drug possession sentences increase at an increasing rate 
[USSC, 2004]. It is assumed that users don’t purchase enough drugs to be sentenced as dealers.
6.  Many previous studies have posited that, even though many illicit drug substances are addictive, the 
demand for illicit drugs varies to some degree with the price of drugs [Silverman and Spruill, 1977; 
Roumasset and Hadreas, 1977; Nisbet and Vakil, 1972]. More recent studies attempting to estimate 
the price elasticity of demand for illicit drugs use price series corrected for purity differences, 
pd = pr/x [DiNardo, 1993; Saffer and Chaloupka, 1999; and Grossman and Chaloupka, 1998]. 645 IMPACT OF WEIGHT-BASED PENALTIES
After making these corrections, DiNardo [1993] ﬁ  nds that cocaine participation is not signiﬁ  cantly 
related to the price of cocaine; however, Saffer and Chaloupka [1999] and Grossman and Chaloupka 
[1998], ﬁ  nd that drug demand is responsive to changes in price. The later paper employs the rational 
addiction framework of Becker and Murphy [1988] to estimate a long-run price elasticity of total 
cocaine consumption [annual participation multiplied by frequency of use] of –1.35, a ﬁ  nding that 
counters the oft-made assumption of price inelasticity for addictive drug consumption. 
7.  Federal sentencing guidelines generally specify that drug trafﬁ  cking sentences increase at an increas-
ing rate, as a step function, for up to 400 grams of heroin, 2 kilograms of cocaine, or 400 kilograms of 
marijuana. Street level dealers would generally hold quantities of illicit drugs below these thresholds. 
Penalties increase but at a decreasing rate for larger weights [USSC, 2004]. 
8.  See their footnote 14.
9.  Kuziemko and Levitt [2004] ﬁ  nd that state level pure drug prices were decreasing in the 1980’s and 
were relatively stable in the 1990’s. They also temper the present discussion by ﬁ  nding that increases 
in overall drug arrests lead to increased pure drug prices, holding other potential inﬂ  uences constant. 
Freeborn [2004], however, distinguishes between the arrest rate for drug sales and drug possession 
and, preliminarily, ﬁ  nds the opposite - an increase in the arrest rate for sales decreases the effective 
price of drugs (the coefﬁ  cient for the arrest rate for drug possession is not signiﬁ  cant). 
10.  If users do not know for certain the purity of drugs consumed, this impact may be exacerbated.
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